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RECONSTRUCTING THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE
BY REDEFINING PROPERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY
John Martinez*
Dean Lipsker and Ms. Heldt, the authors of Regulatory Takings:
A Contract Approach, state:
This Article analyzes the takings problem by focusing on the
nature of and purposes served by property ownership. Professor
Martinez suggests that much of the current confusion in takings
jurisprudence arises from the failure of the courts to develop a
coherent federal constitutional property theory that adequately
addresses the expectations of the private property owner. The
Article proposes replacing the traditional two-step takings analysis
of first determining what constitutes a protectable property interest
and then determining when governmental regulation affects that
interest to an extent requiring compensation, with a one-step
analysis that focuses on the regulatory impact on the functions
that property serves.
Our Article focuses on the second step of the traditional twostep takings analysis without addressing the problem of defining
protectable property interests. We believe, however, that our proposed expectations-based approach is fully consistent with this
Article's proposal.

I.

Introduction

'

The takings "problem" is about many things. It has to do with
the nature of ownership of property, the nature of government, and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; B.A.,
1973, Occidental College; J.D., 1976, Columbia University School of Law.
I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable comments I received on earlier drafts of
this Article from Lee E. Teitelbaum, Associate Academic Dean at the University
of Utah College of Law, my other colleagues on the faculty, Professors John J.
Flynn, Leslie P. Francis, Wayne McCormack and Donald N. Zillman, and Professor
Thomas Ross of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and Professor Gerald
Torres of the University of Minnesota School of Law. I also wish to thank Dean
Ned Spurgeon for summer research allocations from the University of Utah College
of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund and the University of Utah
Research Committee for the award of a Faculty Starter Grant.
1.The threshold proposition in this Article is that there is a takings "problem"
in the law. For a list of the classic analyses of the takings problem, see infra note
4.
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the definition of private rights and public authority and the line
between them.' The takings problem concerns governmental action
affecting private property in such a manner that society must consider
whether the governmental action should be invalidated, compensation
should be paid, or whether some other remedy should be provided.'
Determining when protectable property is involved, when government
action has improperly affected such an interest and what kind of
relief is available, however, has vexed the courts for a number of
4
years.
It may initially seem odd that the takings problem presents such
difficulty, given that there is a constitutional provision that appears
to address the problem directly. The fifth amendment's "just compensation clause" plainly states that the federal government shall
not take private property for public use without just compensation. 5
This prohibition extends to state governments through the "due
process clause" of the fourteenth amendment. 6 Moreover, there are
situations that clearly fall within the just compensation clause. For
example, suppose that an individual owns a vacant lot that happens
to be located in the path of a proposed freeway. The government
can then bring a condemnation proceeding at which a battle of
2. The takings problem involves an interplay of property, government and the
boundary between the two. Elaboration of that interplay, and how society can
develop a workable doctrine, is the thrust of this Article.
3. The study of the takings problem is important so that people, whose property
expectations are affected by governmental action, can legitimately complain in
situations where the government has overstepped its bounds and some sort of
remedy should be provided.
4. For classic analyses of the takings problem, see B. ACKERMAN,
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977)

[hereinafter

ACKERMAN];

PRIVATE

Michelman, Prop-

erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
5. The fifth amendment concludes with the following provision:
[N]or shall private property be taken [by the government] for public use,
without just compensation.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. The fourteenth amendment's due process clause provides in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due
process of law ....

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court first held the fifth amendment's
just compensation clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause in 1897. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378, 2383 n.4 (1987) ("[tihe [fjifth [almendment ...
applies to the

[sitates through the [flourteenth [almendment").
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experts will determine the amount of compensation the individual
will receive.

7

This example illustrates the classic elements of a just compensation
clause claim. First, it involves something society unquestionably
identifies as private property-land. Second, the governmental action
is a "taking" 8 for a "public use" 9 in that it puts the public in the
place of the individual-the vacant lot, formerly the individual's,
will now be used by the public. Finally, the action can be regarded
as an intentional act by the government because the condemning
agency knew that it was drastically altering the individual's relationship to the property10 and thus obligated to compensate the
individual for the act.'
Suppose, however, that an individual purchases a vacant lot that
is zoned for apartment buildings. If the area is later rezoned to
allow only single-family residences, the individual's lost expectation
of someday constructing an apartment building on the land is not
so clearly a loss of "property." In the direct condemnation situation,

a physical tangible vacant lot is involved; here, only an intangible
hope is affected-the individual has not lost use of that property,
but only an expectation or hope about the way he will use it.12
7. See Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A Critique
of the Fair Market Value Model, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 429 [hereinafter Francis].
8. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
9. See Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent
Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1983) [hereinafter Ross].
10. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
11. As long as certain minimal procedural requirements are fulfilled, the exercise
of direct condemnation through the power of eminent domain rarely presents legal
problems.
The power of eminent domain, sometimes known as the power of "direct
condemnation," is referred to as "an attribute of sovereignty." See, e.g., Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 31-33 (1954); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64-67, 646
P.2d 835, 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982) (eminent domain power is "attribute
of sovereignty" which authorizes taking of intangible personal property such as
professional football franchise).
For a critique of the relatively flimsy nature of the "public use" limitation, see
Ross, supra note 9. The use of fair market value to measure "just compensation"
in eminent domain proceedings is analyzed in Francis, supra note 7.
12. The hope of keeping the lot is also involved in the eminent domain setting,
of course, but is deemed incorporated into the fair market value paid as just
compensation. See Francis, supra note 7, at 439-41.
With "direct condemnation," the government proceeds under a constitutional
principle which authorizes it to affect private property with a conscious expectation
that, if it does so, it will be financially obligated to the owner. See supra note
II and accompanying text. With less overt forms of action such as zoning, however,
the government may not expect to pay for its incursion and may act otherwise if
the obligation to compensate is known. See infra note 123 and accompanying text'
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Moreover, even if that hope will be treated as "property" by law,
it is not clear that a "taking" for "public use" has occurred. The
public has surely not acquired the individual's land and it strains
language to say that the public has acquired his hope. The individual's
expectation of someday constructing an apartment building is gone,
but he can still use the lot for single-family residences. 3 But is
extinction of that expectation for a "public purpose" sufficient to
trigger a remedy? If so, should the individual be entitled to have
the rezoning ordinance declared invalid or be able to force the city
to buy his lot or at least pay damages for having diminished the
potential value of the lot?
To take a more drastic example, suppose instead that the lot is

rezoned for "conservation area" use,

4

rendering the lot unsuitable

for any reasonably profitable use. The individual's hope of deriving
any profit from the lot would vanish. Is that expectation "property"?
Courts and scholars have long struggled with these important
questions. After generally avoiding decisions on the merits in takings
cases for nearly a decade,' 5 the Supreme Court, in 1987, decided
three cases involving "takings" challenges to governmental exercise
of the power to control land use.' 6 In this trilogy of takings cases,

13. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the extinction of the individual's
expectation is for a public purpose-the public may be better off with fewer
apartments in the area.
14. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538, 539, 720 P.2d 513,
514 (1986) ("conservation area" restricted to use for open space, free of substantial
physical construction or structures).
15. See MacDonald v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53 (1986).
16. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987)
(Court held that Commission's requirement that Nollan convey easement to state
allowing public access along seaward side of their coastal property as condition of
Commission's grant of permit to allow them to demolish existing dilapidated
bungalow and construct new three-bedroom house constituted "taking" under just
compensation clause); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388-89 (1987) (Court held that if county's zoning
ordinance prohibited all land use, it was taking of property through regulatory
action, permitting property owner to recover damages from county for period of
ordinance's enforcement against property); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1249 (1987) (Court held that Pennsylvania could
prohibit coal mining under certain structures unless coal "pillars" were left to
support overlying structures, despite effectively preventing coal owners from mining
about 2% of their coal, which amounted to about 27 million tons). For a more
detailed discussion of these cases, see Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the 1987
Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, I HOFSTRA PROP.
L.J. 39 (1988) [hereinafter Martinez].
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the Court affirmed the continued validity of a three-part analytical
model in addressing the takings problem: (1) is private property
involved; (2) has governmental action so affected it as to require
7
a remedy; and (3) what remedy should be provided?1
Part II of this Article critically examines that model. Part III
argues that the first two questions are fundamentally indistinguishable
and that to treat them as distinct inquiries is unworkable. Part IV

therefore proposes a functional approach under which individuals
are protected from governmental regulation only insofar as the
reasons for having property are preserved. The Article concludes by
identifying the questions that must be addressed before the takings
doctrine can be reconstructed along functional lines.
II.
A.

The Framework of the Takings Problem

Protectable Property

The threshold determination of whether governmental action affects private property in violation of the Constitution is whether
protectable "property" is involved.' 8 This is true whether the challenge is made under the just compensation clause 9 or under the due

17. For other references to the takings problem as a three-part inquiry, see
supra note 4, at 6; Note, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A
Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1447, 1479-81 (1984).
18. Protectable "property" is the point of departure dictated by the text of
the just compensation clause, which prohibits the taking of private property without
just compensation, as well as by the text of the due process clause, which prohibits
the deprivation of property without due process of law. See supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text.
19. In takings situations, the threshold question is whether protectable "property" is involved, regardless of whether the government purports to be exercising
the power of eminent domain or some other power. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (in police power setting, involving regulation of
pesticide manufacture); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502-03 (1945) (in eminent domain setting, no property right in flow of river);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) (in eminent
domain setting, property right in certain leases); A-B Cattle Co. v. United States,
621 F.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (in police power setting, no property right to
silty water); see also Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 209 (1984) (state
constitutional authority to assert "public trust" easement over private lands); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (federal power over foreign affairs
authorizing freezing of Iranian assets); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 171-72 (1979) (federal commerce clause power to regulate access to navigable
waters).
ACKERMAN,

162
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process clause.20 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court shed light
on the meaning of "property" for federal constitutional purposes.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 2' a college assistant professor claimed
that a university's failure to provide him with notice and a hearing
before deciding not to renew his one-year contract was a denial of
his procedural due process rights which infringed upon his property
interests.22 The Court ruled, however, that in order for a person to
have a property interest, he must have a "legitimate claim of en-

titlement to

it.

' 'z3

In short, an individual must have more than an

abstract need, desire or unilateral expectation. 24 The Court found
no term in the professor's contract, university policy or state statute
that supplied the basis for any legitimate claim to contract renewal.2 5
The Court's holding in Roth indicates that state and federal law,
other than federal constitutional law, may determine which expectations are to be accorded "property" status. At the same time, not
all expectations denominated "property" under various state or federal laws will necessarily be treated as property for federal constitutional purposes.2 6 Similarly, not all interests denied property status
by state or federal law will necessarily be denied federal constitutional
7
protection as "property."
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,28 the Supreme Court, however, held that a separate federal constitutional inquiry into the
definition of property is necessary, thus apparently abandoning the
Roth principle of deference to state and federal law. In Ruckelshaus,
the Monsanto chemical company was required to submit research
and test data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as
part of the process for obtaining licenses for the manufacture and
sale of pesticides.2 9 Monsanto alleged that the information was "property" under Missouri state law, and that its release by the EPA to
Monsanto's competitors in the course of the EPA's review of other

20. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (deliberate non-negligent
government conduct must be shown to establish due process deprivation); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Eames v. City of Logan, 762
F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1985).
21. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. See id. at '566-69.
23. Id. at 577.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 578.
26. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
28. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
29. See id. at 998.
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chemical registration applications was a "taking" in violation of the
fifth amendment."
Although the EPA did not seriously dispute this contention, the
Court neither accepted Monsanto's claim nor undertook an independent inquiry into Missouri law. 3 ' Roth's deference to state law
definitions of property was noted, but the Court seemingly abandoned
that approach in favor of an inquiry into the "general perception"
of trade secrets as property, drawn from such sources as prior
Supreme Court decisions, property and philosophical treatises, and
the congressional legislative history of pesticide regulation.12 Only
after concluding that the information involved was property under
the constitutional inquiry did the Court return to state law, holding
that "to the extent that Monsanto [had] an interest in its . . .data
cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that
property right [was] protected by the [t]akings [c]lause of the [f]ifth
[a]mendment."33
Similarly, the Court will not automatically refuse to extend constitutional protection to expectations not regarded as "property"
under pertinent federal or state law. 3 4 In Ruckelshaus, for example,
the EPA argued that by requiring the research and test data to be
submitted, Congress had "pre-empted" state law from defining such
information as property."5 In rejecting this argument, the Court
referred to Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith3 6 In
Webb's, a Florida statute purportedly allowed a county court to
retain the interest on interpleader funds deposited with the court
pending final distribution among the contending parties. 7 The state
court had construed the statute as declaring that the interest was
not "property." ' Referring to property law in other states and in
federal courts, the Supreme Court found that such an interest was
generally considered to be a "property" interest of the ultimate
distributees which the state could not simply define out of existence.39

30. See id. at 998-99.
31. See id. at 1001.

32. See id. at 1002-03.
33. Id. at 1003-04.

34. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
35. 467 U.S. at 1012.
36. See id.; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).

37. 449 U.S. at 155-56.
38. Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 958 (Fla.
1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
39. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
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In Ruckelshaus, the Court held that Congress could not by similar
0
ipse dixit deny Monsanto's property interest.4
Ultimately, the nature of protectable property for "takings" purposes, however, is a constitutional issue, even if deference is given
to state or federal laws. The next question under the takings problem
doctrine is whether governmental action has so affected property as
to require a remedy.
B. Government Action Affecting Property-Two Countervailing
Theories
Courts employ two legal theories to ascertain whether government
action has so affected property as to warrant a remedy: the "due
process approach" and the "just compensation approach."'4 These
theories can be analyzed according to four factors: (1) the characterization of the property involved; (2) the closely connected question of the government's effect on property; (3) the remedies involved;
42
and (4) the extent of judicial deference to legislative determinations.
1. Due Process Approach
The due process theory is exemplified by the Supreme Court's
decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.4 3 In Euclid,
Ambler Realty owned sixty-eight acres of land which it hoped to
develop for industrial purposes, a use for which it alleged the property
had a value of $10,000 per acre.44 A Village of Euclid zoning
ordinance, however, restricted the property to residential use, for
which Ambler alleged the property had a value of $2,500 per acre.4 5
Ambler sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on the ground
46
that it violated due process on its face.
After summarizing various reasons which might sustain the segregation of industrial from residential uses as a proper exercise of
the police power to protect the public, the Court concluded:
If these reasons ... do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound

policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated

40.
41.
42.
whole.
43.
44.
45.
46.

467 U.S. at 1012.
See infra notes 43-127 and accompanying text.
These factors resemble those used to examine the takings problem as a
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id.at 384.
See id.
See id.at 367.
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at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us
...
from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare."
The Court was particularly concerned that Ambler sought to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance as unconstitutional on its face, and

thus render it invalid in all circumstances, not just with respect to
Ambler's property. 48 In Nectow v. City of Cambridge,49 the Court
had the opportunity to deal with the application of the zoning power
to particular property.
In Nectow, the plaintiff owned a 140,000 square foot parcel located
at the boundary between an area of the city zoned for residential
uses and an unzoned area developed mostly for industrial uses. 5" The
city had somehow managed to draw the line dividing the residential
zoned sections and the unzoned sections in such a way as to lop off
a 100-foot wide portion of the parcel as residential, leaving the remainder unzoned. 5 ' Nectow applied for a permit "to erect any lawful

buildings [on the tract] without regard to the provisions of the ordinance including such tract within a residential district."

2

When that

permit was refused, Nectow sought a mandatory injunction in state
court requiring the issuance of the permit on the ground that it
deprived him of his property without due process."
The Supreme Court deferred to a master's finding, noting that
"the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected [would] not be promoted by
the disposition made by the ordinance of the [property] in ques-

47. Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
48. See id. The Court made the following observation:
[Wihere the equitable remedy of injunction is sought . .. not upon the
ground of a present infringement or denial of a specific right, or of a
particular injury in process of actual execution, but upon the broad
ground [of] the mere existence and threatened enforcement of the ordinance ... the court will not scrutinize its provisions, sentence by
sentence, to ascertain by a process of piecemeal dissection whether there
may be, here and there, provisions of a minor character, or relating to
matters of administration . . . which, if attacked separately, might not
withstand the test of constitutionality.
Id.
49. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
50. See id.at 186.
51. See id. at 187.
52. Id.at 186.
53. See id. at 185.
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tion. ' '5 4 Paraphrasing Euclid, the Court set forth the standard for
judicial review:
[A] court should not set aside the determination of public officers
in such a matter unless it is clear that their action "has no
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper
sense.""
Accordingly, the Court sustained the state court's mandatory in-6
junction directing issuance of the permit sought by the plaintiff.1
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian," the Court upheld a municipal ordinance under a due process analysis. 8 At issue in Hadacheck was
a Los Angeles ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to establish
or maintain a brickyard or place for the manufacture or burning
of brick.5 9 Hadacheck, prosecuted for operating a brickyard despite
the ordinance,6' brought a petition for habeas corpus alleging that
the ordinance was invalid because it reduced the value of his property6
and therefore deprived him of property without due process of law. 1
The Court first observed that Hadacheck could not only use his
property for purposes other than as a brickyard, but that he could
even continue to extract the clay deposits for making bricks elsewhere,62
as long as he did not actually manufacture bricks on the premises.
Noting the California Supreme Court's finding that the brickyard
was injurious to public health and welfare because it produced fumes,
gases, smoke, soot, steam and dust, 63 the Court upheld the ordinance
as a valid exercise of the city's police power. 64

54. Id. at 188.
55. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395).
56. See id.at 187-89.
57. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
58. See id. at 410-11.
59. See Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 417, 132 P. 584, 585 (1913), aff'd
sub nom. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
60. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 404-05.
61. See id. at 405-07. Hadacheck claimed that the ordinance reduced the value
of his property from $800,000 for use as a brickyard to $60,000 for residential
purposes. Id. at 405.
62. See id. at 411.
63. See id. at 408, 411.
64. See id. at 410.
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential
powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed,
seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative
necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because

19881
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Although the plaintiffs in Euclid, Nectow and Hadacheck each
sought to use land for industrial purposes,": in each case the Court
did not consider the intended or existing industrial use as the "property" involved, but instead considered the "property"
the land
itself.,,' This is significant because the governmental effect in each
case was held to be the prevention of an intended or existing use,
not the deprivation of the underlying realty. In Euclid, restricting
Ambler to residential uses was justified because, in the context of
a generalized attack leveled at the entire ordinance, the Court concluded that the public health, safety, welfare and morals were advanced.67 In Nectow, in contrast, restricting the landowner to residential
uses was not justified because no "public purpose" was served in
the particular application. ' In Hadacheck, the prevention of the
continued operation of the brickyard was justified because of the
adverse, nuisance-like effects it imposed on the surrounding community.1,9
The remedial aspect of the "due process" cases is also worth
noting. Euclid, Nectow and Hadacheck all involved attempts to
invalidate ordinances, not claims for damages. Ambler Realty sought
an injunction against the Euclid zoning ordinance, 7' Nectow sought
issuance of a development permit 7 ' and Hadacheck sought a writ
of habeas corpus. 2 Invalidation prohibits the implementation of
local zoning in the particular circumstances, and thereby frustrates
preservation of the general health, safety, welfare and morals that
such zoning represents. In contrast, awarding monetary relief would
allow implementation, but at a price.
Finally, in each of these cases the Supreme Court was highly
deferential towaids governmental control of land use. 73 Whether a

of conditions once obtaining .... To so hold would preclude development

and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress,
and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to
the good of the community.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384; Hadacheck, 239
U.S. at 405.
66. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188-89: Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89; Hadacheck,

239 U.S. at 411-12.
67. 272 U.S. at 391.
68. 277 U.S. at 188-89.
69. 239 U.S. at 410-11.
70. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
71. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 186.
72. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 404-05.
73. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390-95; Hadacheck, 239

U.S. at 410-11.
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public purpose was served was left largely to the discretion of the
governmental entities charged with the authority to draw lines. So
long as a "public purpose" was served, substantial detrimental effects
on property interests were upheld.
2.

Just Compensation Approach

The just compensation theory, like the due process approach,
involves defining property, determining the significance of state action
affecting property, resolving the significance of the remedy sought,
and deciding the extent of deference to be paid to governmental
decisions. These elements, however, are applied differently. Under
the just compensation analysis, property is viewed more expansively
74
and a lesser incursion will be deemed sufficient to trigger relief.
In addition, much less deference is paid to governmental
determinations 75 and the remedy sought is compensation, not just
6
invalidation.1
The just compensation approach originated in the Supreme Court's
holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.7 7 Pennsylvania common
law recognized three separate property interests with respect to coal
lands: (1) the right to use the surface of the land; (2) the right to
mine coal under the surface; and (3) the right to support of the
surface.7 1 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Pennsylvania Coal Company
sold the surface rights of the land in question to the Mahons'
predecessor in title.79 In the deed, however, the company retained
the right to the coal under the land, as well as the right to the

support of the surface."" Moreover, the predecessor in title also
waived all claims against the company for harm caused by subsidence
resulting from mining operations." Subsequently, Pennsylvania passed
the Kohler Act, 8 2 which prohibited the mining of coal beneath someone else's property in such a manner as to cause subsidence of

74. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 124-27 and 'accompanying text.
77. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
78. See id. at 395. Accordingly, the right to use the surface could be alienated
separately from the right to the support of the surface. See Penman v. Jones, 256
Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043 (1917); see also Captline v. County of Allegheny, 74 Pa.
Commw. 85, 459 A.2d 1298 (1983) (separation of property interests still part of
Pennsylvania property law), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
79. 260 U.S. at 412.

80. See id.
81. See id.
82. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
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various surface uses, including residential uses. 83 When the company
gave the Mahons notice that it was about to engage in mining
beneath their residence and that it did not intend to leave columns
of coal in place to support the surface, the Mahons, citing the
84
Kohler Act, obtained an injunction in state court.
In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court held
that, as applied to the circumstances, the Kohler Act was invalid,
thus overturning the injunction.85 The Court determined that the
public interest involved was limited because only the Mahons' and
other similarly situated houses in a relatively restricted part of Pennsylvania were involved.8 6 In addition, the Court found that the
interest of the state in personal safety could be achieved by a notice
requirement, rather than by a prohibition from mining in such
circumstances. 87 On the other hand, the Court found a severe impact
on the coal company-its retained right to surface support recognized
by Pennsylvania common law, as well as its contract right obtained
through the waiver of claims resulting from subsidence, were both
abolished. 8 Thus, the limited public interest coupled with the adverse
effect on the coal company persuaded the Court that the Kohler
Act effected a "taking" of the coal company's property for which
the power of eminent domain, not the police power, had to be
exercised and compensation provided. 9
Two aspects of Pennsylvania Coal, however, make it a troublesome
foundation for a new direction in the law. First, takings cases usually
cast the property owner as a plaintiff who sues for harm to his or
her property. 90 Thus, Pennsylvania Coal is peculiar in that the coal
company, whose property interests were the subject of the dispute,
was cast as the defendant whom the Mahons wished to enjoin from
mining under their home. 9' Second, in the typical takings case the

83. See id.
84. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 394-95. According to standard practice, if
the owner of the coal did not also own the surface rights, or at least the right
to surface support, the owner of the coal rights would leave enough coal to assure
surface support, or artificial supports would be ifistalled. See id. at 420 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 414.
86. See id.at 413-14.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 414.
89. See id. at 413-15.
90. See MacDonald v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 342 (1986).
91. 260 U.S. at 412-14.
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property owner seeks compensation. 92 In Pennsylvania Coal, the coal
company had not sought compensation; in fact, it had sought no
affirmative relief at all. 93 The only question before the Court was
whether the injunction in favor of the Mahons issued by the state
courts would be upheld. Accordingly, the discussion about compensation in Pennsylvania Coal is pure dictum.
(a) Definition of the Relevant Property
In addition, it is instructive to consider Justice Holmes' conclusion
in Pennsylvania Coal that the coal company's rights were completely
destroyed.9 4 If that is true, then the situation might be thought to
incorporate one of the classic characteristics of direct condemnations-the complete extinction of a private interest. 95 But whether
the company's rights were actually completely destroyed depends on
what one considers as the "relevant" property. A broad definition
of the relevant property would treat "the right to mine coal" under
the Mahon residence as the proper starting point for analysis. Using
that definition, it is clear that the company was not completely
deprived of its "property," because it could have mined the coal
as long as it left supporting columns of coal or wooden timbers in
96
place to support the surface.
The company argued, however, that leaving wooden timbers instead
of supporting columns of coal to support the surface would not be
economically feasible. 97 The issue was thus narrowed to whether the
company had to leave such columns of coal. Justice Holmes.accepted
that narrow definition of the relevant property; he concluded that
"[the Kohler Act] purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate . . . . 9 The
"estate" protected was the right to mine coal without regard to
surface subsidence. 99 That estate was represented by the columns of

92. See infra note 1.23 and accompanying text.
93. 260 U.S. at 412.
94. See id. at 414.
95. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
96. This lack of complete deprivation constituted one of the bases upon which
the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the state in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1249-50 (1987). For a more detailed
analysis, see Martinez, supra note 16, at 49-52.
97. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 395.
98. Id. at 414.
99. This combined the second and third estates recognized under Pennsylvania
common law. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Thus, the second estatethe right to the coal-was construed to confer on the coal company the right to
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coal that would otherwise have to be left in place to support the

surface. 11
In contrast to the narrow definition of the relevant property
adopted by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court
has taken a broad perspective in defining the relevant property in
due process theory cases, holding that the "property" in each instance
is the land itself, not the intended or existing industrial use of it.""
As the decision in Pennsylvania Coal demonstrates, the initial definition of the relevant property almost inevitably determines whether
the property interest is deemed completely destroyed or merely reduced in value by the governmental action involved. A narrow
definition is more likely to lead to the conclusion that property is
destroyed; a broad definition is more likely to lead to the conclusion
that property is merely diminished in value." 2 It is therefore critical
to provide a standard for determining whether the relevant property
should be narrowly or broadly defined in any given situation. The
Court in Pennsylvania Coal, however, did not address that question
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not been consistent.",3
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 04 the Court
explored whether the relevant property for purposes of takings analysis should be narrowly or broadly defined."' 5 In Penn Central, New

mine. while the third estate-the right to surface support-was construed to confer
on the coal company the right to conduct its activities without regard to surface
subsidence. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (describing estates involved as
both property interest in mining coal as well as contract right to be free of obligation
to provide surface support: "[the Kohler Act] purports to abolish what is recognized
in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and what is declared
by the [c]ourt below to be a contract hitherto binding [upon] the plaintiffs") (emphasis
added); see also id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (majority claims that "the
restriction destroys existing rights of property and contract") (emphasis added);
but cf. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (interpreting right protected by majority in
Pennsylvania Coal as consisting solely of third estate-the right to surface support)
[hereinafter Rose].
100. The columns of coal thus had a dual character. Intrinsically, they were
valuable coal deposits; symbolically, they represented the obligation to support the
surface.
101. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
102. It take less intrusive governmental action to affect substantially property
defined narrowly than property defined broadly. See Rose, supra note 99, at 56668 (scope of relevant property has dramatic impact on "takings" determination).
103. See id. at 568 (highlighting indeterminate character of the Court's discussion
in providing standard for determining whether relevant property should be narrowly
or broadly defined).
104. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
105. See id.
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York City prohibited the Penn Central Transportation Company
from demolishing the historic Grand Central Terminal and constructing a fifty-five-story office building in its place.' 6 Penn Central
claimed this completely destroyed its right to build in the air space
above the terminal.' 0 7 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole ....

Arguably, Penn Central thus authorizes a broad definition of the
relevant property. In contrast, however, the Court adopted a narrow
definition in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.' 9
In Loretto, the Court held that a New York statute authorizing
a cable television company to install cables and switch boxes on a
privately owned apartment building was a "taking" because it constituted a permanent, physical occupation by governmental authority."10 A broad definition would have considered the land, together
with the apartment building and the uses to which they might be
put, as the relevant property. Under that definition, Loretto was
not completely deprived of property, but only of the use of a small
part of the building. Yet, the Court adopted a narrow definition
by treating the one and one-half cubic feet of the apartment building
occupied by the cables and switch boxes as the relevant property."'
(b)

Governmental Effect on Property

The second factor in analyzing the just compensation theory, as
established by Pennsylvania Coal, is determining the government's
effect on property. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court held that the

106. See id. at 116-17.
107. See id. at 122.
108. Id. at 130-31.
109. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
110. See id. at 425-26. The Loretto decision, however, has been severely criticized.
See, e.g., Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983). The most devastating criticism appears
in Justice Blackmun's Loretto dissent. See 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (no taking when federal statute
prevented sale of eagle feathers because beneficial uses other than sale remained).
Ill. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16.
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coal company was completely prevented by the Kohler Act from
exercising its right to surface support because it was required to
leave either coal or timber columns in place." 2 Short of that situation,
however, the Court has had difficulty articulating a standard for
determining when governmental action so approaches the direct condemnation situation as to trigger fifth amendment protection. Only
the permanent physical occupation involved in Loretto appears to
be the clear case." 3 In other situations, the Court has folded consideration of the effect on property into a multi-factor analysis.1"4
The Court has articulated three factors as particularly significant in
determining whether a "taking" has occurred: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which
the regulation interferes with identifiable investment-backed expec-

112. 260 U.S. at 414-15.
113. 458 U.S. at 425-26.
114. The Supreme Court has stated that if governmental action does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental objective, a "taking" occurs. See United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985). This statement,
made with respect to takings jurisprudence, is troublesome because it seems to fall
in the interstices between the due process and just compensation theories and
addresses when governmental action affecting property will require a remedy. See
Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference With Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 66 (1987) (referring to this as alternative
takings test).
In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes premised transforming governmental action
affecting property into an involuntary exercise of eminent domain on the finding
that the coal company's property was entirely destroyed. See supra notes 94-100
and accompanying text. In contrast, the Supreme Court's statement in Riverside
begins with the other side of the "effect on the property owner-public purpose"
equation: it first examines the governmental justification for the effect on the
property owner. 474 U.S. at 126-29.
Under the due process approach, the Court has deferred to legislative determinations regarding whether a legitimate governmental objective is served. See supra
note 73 and accompanying text. If this were not so, then conceivably, even when
public purposes were only "reasonably" rather than "substantially" served by
governmental actions that minimally affected property, compensation might be
required. Such an approach would come dangerously close to making it a tort for
government to govern. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court's statement probably cannot be taken
literally. To do so would mean that closer judicial scrutiny would be triggered
anytime property was affected at all. It therefore makes more sense to construe
the statement to mean that if the threshold finding is made that property has been
so drastically affected that it has been effectively destroyed and no public purpose
is substantially advanced by such action, then a remedy, to wit, compensation,
must be provided. This interpretation appears to be supported by the Court's recent
decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); see Martinez, supra note 16, at 65-66.
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tations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.'
The
Court, however, has not clearly defined those factors nor explained
their interrelationship, tending instead to engage in ad hoc deter-

minations. 116
(c)

The Remedy Sought

The third factor in analyzing the just compensation theory as
established by Pennsylvania Coal involves remedies. Justice Holmes
fashioned a link between one governmental power and another: If
the police power is improperly exercised, in some circumstances, it
may be transformed into the involuntary exercise of the power of
eminent domain.' 7 Ordinary exercises of the power of eminent domain usually involve a deliberate, conscious decision on the part of
the government to affect property in such a manner that the fifth
amendment's compensation requirement is triggered." '" In contrast,
under the just compensation theory, mere negligent governmental
action may suffice to obligate the government to pay compensation." 9
(d) The Extent of Judicial Deference
The final factor in analyzing the just compensation theory concerns
the relatively minimal deference extended to legislative determinations
regarding public purposes. Contrary to the deferential due process
approach established by the Court in Hadacheck, Euclid and Nectow,120
Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal, seemed relatively unconcerned
about second-guessing the legislative judgment regarding the significance of the public interest involved in prohibiting the coal company
from mining in a manner which would cause subsidence.' 2' Justice

115. See, e.g.,

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.

211,

225

(1986).
116. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
("essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").

117. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 ("[tlhe general rule ... is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking").
118. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

119. The Court has recently held, however, that mere negligent due process
violations will not give rise to government damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1981). See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Governmental action must

be "deliberate" in order for such liability to arise. Id. at 333-34.
120. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
121. 260 U.S. at 413-14.
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Holmes boldly ascertained whether a public interest would be furthered by the prohibition and found none.' 2
Once it is determined that a "taking" of "property" has occurred,
the focus of the takings problem analysis then shifts to the question
of the appropriate remedy. Prior to the Court's "takings" decisions
in 1987, there was substantial debate whether damages should be
provided. 23
C.

Remedies

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,'24 the Supreme Court held that if a county's zoning ordinance prohibited all use of land and was therefore a taking of
property through regulatory action, then the property owner could
recover damages for the period during which the ordinance was in
force against the property.' 25 One might have inferred from First
English that every "taking" of "property" required compensation.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 26 decided shortly after
First English, however, the Court introduced a "per se takings
justification rule," which provides that where takings are found
pursuant to the "per se takings" line of cases such as Loretto, there
are circumstances under which compensation is not required., 2 7 Unfortunately, the Court did not define those circumstances with any
degree of precision.

122. See id. A ramification of Justice Holmes' approach is that such close scrutiny
of legislative purposes was conducted in the context of property concerns. While
the Court has closely examined the exercise of governmental power when liberty
interests are involved, it has hesitated to do so when property concerns are at
issue. See generally Tushnet, The Newer Property: A Suggestion for the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261; Comment, Testing the
Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations. Substantive Due Process as a
Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the
Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983); Sterk, Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land
Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J. 113 (1984); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker
& Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984); Note,
Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy
in Challenging Land Use Regulation, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 711 (1982).
124. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
125. See id.
126. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
127. See id. at 3145-48. For further discussion, see Martinez, supra note 16, at
54.
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Deconstructing the Takings Problem

A. The Property-Governmental Action Dichotomy Renders
Existing Takings Analysis Unworkable
Before First English, the just compensation doctrine was a loose
cannon potentially aimed at any regulatory governmental action
affecting property; after First English, that cannon is loaded with
the potent shot of the compensation remedy. The just compensation
theory, however, remains a loose cannon because it is difficult to
predict with any degree of certainty when a taking will be found.
There are, of course, some clear cases. The most obvious is the
direct condemnation situation, where governmental action is a deliberate, conscious decision to sever the exclusive relationship between
a property owner and his property, followed by judicial proceedings
to determine "fair market value" and effect the transfer of title.' 28
There is also the "de facto" taking area, in which governmental
initiation of direct condemnation proceedings, coupled with restrictions amounting to the prohibition of all reasonable "private" use
and the use of the property by the public, will give rise to the
remedy of judicially compelled direct condemnation. 129 For example,
in Peacock v. County of Sacramento,3 ° the plaintiff owned property
adjacent to a privately owned airfield. 3 ' In 1960, the county leased
the airfield as a public facility.' 32 The county also zoned twenty-six
and one-half acres of the plaintiff's property in the proposed approach pattern to the airport. " In 1965, the county tentatively
decided to cancel the airport project because it appeared that the
acquisition of the existing facility would be too costly. 3 4 From that
year until 1969, when the case was decided on appeal, the County
Board of Supervisors remained deadlocked-neither completely abandoning the airport project nor going forward with it.' The appellate
court concluded that the county was required to purchase the entire
fee outright, since during this interim period the plaintiff had been
deprived of all reasonable beneficial use of his property. 3 6
128. See generally Francis, supra note 7, at 439-41.
129. See D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING
DEVELOPMENT, CASES AND MATERIALS 97-99 (2d ed. 1985).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

271
See
See
See
See
See
See

AND CONTROL OF LAND

Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
id. at 846-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
id. at 848, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
id. at 846-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
id. at 850, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
id. at 850, 864-65, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 395, 404-05.
id. at 864-65, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
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These cases represent clear examples where one can ask in an
orderly manner what a person owns and what has been done to it.
That paradigm breaks down, however, where less typical interests
37
and forms of governmental action are involved. The Ruckelshaus
decision seemingly presents a third "clear" case, but one which
ultimately invites consideration of the relationship between two issues
held separate to this point: whether governmental action has so
affected property as to require a remedy and whether "property"
is involved at all.
In Ruckelshaus, Monsanto claimed that information provided to
the EPA was "property" which had been "taken" by the EPA
when released to Monsanto's competitors.' 38 As discussed earlier,
the Court concluded that the information was "property."' 3 9 In
determining whether property had been "taken," the Court recited
the multi-factor litany 40 and held that consideration of the property
owner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations" was disposi-

tive. 14,

The Court noted that the data had been submitted to the EPA
during three periods. 42 The Court concluded that Monsanto did not
have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that information
submitted before October 22, 1972 would be used exclusively for
the purpose of considering Monsanto's application. 43 The Court
based its conclusion on the fact that the EPA's "practice of using
data submitted by one company during consideration of the application of a subsequent applicant was widespread and well known.'"44
The Court concluded that data submitted to the EPA between
October 22, 1972 and September 30, 1978, however, should have
been maintained in the strictest confidence. ' 4 The Court observed
that on October 22, 1972, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) was amended allowing applicants to protect
their testing and research information from disclosure by designating
it as a trade secret at the time of submission.'4 6 Since Monsanto
had complied with the terms of the Act, the governmental guarantee
'4 7
"formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation.'
137. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
138. See id. at 998-99.
139. Id. at 1000-04; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.

140. 467 U.S. at 1005.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
See id. at 991-97.
See id. at 1008-10, 1013.
Id.at 1009.
See id. at 1010-13.
See id.at 991-93.
Id. at 1011.
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Effective September 30, 1978, however, FIFRA was amended once
more to provide that information submitted with pesticide registrations could be disclosed to the applicant's competitors once a tenyear period after submission had expired. 48 Accordingly, the Court
held that Monsanto had no basis for expecting the information
submitted during this third period of time would be kept confi49
dential. 1
Ruckelshaus illustrates the haziness, and perhaps the artificiality,
of the boundary between defining property and determining when
it has been so affected by governmental action that a remedy is
required. In Ruckelshaus, the Court apparently concluded that the
information involved was "property" before it embarked on the
discussion about Monsanto's "reasonable investment-backed expectation" regarding it. Yet, the ensuing discussion seemed to define
property all over again. The Court relied upon the discussion in
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 1s0 which in turn
derived from the Roth inquiry into the definition of property, to
the effect that a " 'reasonable investment-backed expectation' " must
be more than a " 'unilateral expectation or an abstract need.' ,,15,
As the discussion in the "protectable property" section of this Article
demonstrates, that is the standard used to determine whether property
exists at all, not whether it has been so affected as to require a
52
remedy.
The problem in Ruckelshaus, and the takings area in general, lies
in the separation of property ownership from governmental limitation
regarding the incidents of ownership. In the usual case, perhaps,
one can act as if the separation were real. The law has long recognized-as if it were natural-the infrequency of direct governmental restrictions on property. The less typical cases, such as
Ruckelshaus, however, suggest that property ownership is not a
naturally occurring event to which government is a stranger, but
rather a socially created proposition in which government participates.
B. The Nonconforming Use, Vested Rights and Estoppel
Theories at Common Law Bridge the Analytic Gap Between
Property and Governmental Action Affecting It
The notion that governmental action affecting property creates it
is not new. It is hardly a revelation to positive-law theorists,1'5 who
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 993-97.
See id. at 1006-08, 1013.
449 U.S. 155 (1980).
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 (quoting Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161).
See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
Austin is generally considered the founder of legal positivism. See J. AUSTIN,
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assert that property interests exist primarily as they are given legal
recognition by the state. 5 4 It may be a concept with which naturalrights theorists,'5 5 however, may disagree, because they maintain that
property rights exist independently of the state. 5 6 Yet, in the land
use area itself, there are a number of well-established doctrines
dealing with when expectations will be protected in spite of changes
in applicable rules.' 57 In doing so, these doctrines define protectable
"property" in different circumstances. A series of examples is illustrative.
1.

The Nonconforming Use Theory

Assume, for example, that an individual owns an apartment building on a lot located in an area zoned for apartments. Assume further
that the local zoning is changed to allow only single family residences.
Is the person's expectation of continuing the apartment use protected

I LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R. Campbell 5th ed. 1885); see also R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 16 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN]; G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 467 (1973). H. L. A. Hart is generally regarded as the most powerful
exponent of Austin's theory. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); see
DWORKIN, supra, at 16. See generally Spann, Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 669
(1987); Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings; Private Property and the Power
of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253 (1986).
154. See generally Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land
as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039.
155. John Locke is generally considered the leading exponent of natural rights

theory. See, e.g., J.

LOCKE,

Two

TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

(P. Laslett rev. ed.

1963). The most widely recognized modern proponent of natural rights theory is

Ronald Dworkin. See R.

DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

(1986); R.

DWORKIN,

A

MATTER

OF PRINCIPLE (1985); DWORKIN, supra note 153. For a recent analysis of Dworkin's
thesis, see Soper, Book Review, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1166 (1987).
156. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For a critical review of Epstein's book, see Note, Richard
Epstein on the Foundationsof Takings Jurisprudence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 791 (1986).
157. For analyses of these concepts, see Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights,
Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978) [hereinafter Cunningham & Kremer]; Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of
Multi-Land Use Permits, I I Sw. U.L. REV. 545 (1979); Heeter, Zoning Estoppel:
Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning
Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63. These concepts have sometimes been construed
as originating at least in part from the due process and just compensation clauses.
See, e.g., Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1197 (8th Cir. 1983);
Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1980)
(McCormick, J., dissenting). More frequently, however, courts refer to these concepts
as common law doctrines ameliorating the harshness of applying changed law to
existing uses. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 107-08, 106 N.E.2d 34,
35 (1952) ("the property interest affected by the particular ordinance is too substantial to justify its deprivation in light of the objectives to be achieved by
enforcement of the provision").
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as "property?" The "nonconforming use theory" holds that the
individual should be given a reasonable amount of time to phase
out his apartment building.' The phase-out period should take into
account such factors as the original investment, present actual or
depreciated value, dates of construction, amortization for tax purposes, salvage value, remaining useful life and the harm to the public
if the use were to remain after the rezoning occurs. 5 9
Sometimes, however, immediate elimination of existing uses may
be required. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the Supreme Court upheld
the immediate elimination of an existing brickyard, apparently because the brickyard emitted dust, smoke and fumes. 60 Yet, courts
have at times held that the existing use was simply not important
enough to be protected as "property." In People v. Miller,' 6 1 the
defendant had raised pigeons in his home as a hobby since 1945.162
In 1947, the Town of North Hempstead, New York, enacted an
ordinance prohibiting the harboring of pigeons in residential areas
without a permit. 63 The case could have been decided on the "noxious use" basis implicit in Hadacheck'64 on the ground that pigeons
can be nuisances. Instead, the court expressly avoided that ground
and held that only a "purely incidental use of property for recreational or amusement purposes only" was involved, not "property"
65
protected by the nonconforming use theory.
Hadacheck could not operate a brickyard on his land, Miller could
not raise pigeons. Were the expectations in each case justifiably
"taken" in light of their nuisance character or were they deemed
not to exist at all? Miller could have been decided under a nuisance
theory under which property admittedly exists, the court simply chose

158. This is actually a misnomer because the concept applies to nonconforming
structures, as in the hypothetical, as well as to nonconforming uses, as in the
situation in which a sixteen-room "single-family" mansion has been subdivided
into apartments. Thus, to be accurate the concept should perhaps be referred to
as the "nonconforming development theory."
159. See,. e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610
P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1979) (billboards), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S.
490 (1981); Harris v. Mayor and City Council, 35 Md. App. 572, 371 A.2d 706
(1977) (injunction directing that structures converted to multi-unit dwellings be
returned to prior less intensive use). See generally R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK,
LAND USE CONTROLS, CASES AND MATERIALS 194-98 (1981).
160. 239 U.S. 394, 408-10 (1915).
161. 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
162. Id. at 106-07, 106 N.E.2d at 34-35.
163. Id.
164. 239 U.S. at 411.
165. 304 N.Y. at 109, 106 N.E.2d at 36.
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not to do so. Hadacheck could have been decided on the ground
that the expectation of continuing the brickyard was not "property."
Similarly, the termination of the use of an individual's lot for
apartments may be viewed either as the "taking" of the person's
property justified by the interest of the community in single-family
residential development, or, alternatively, as a governmental declaration that his expectation is not "property." Perhaps the two
theories are really one: whether property exists and whether governmental action affecting property gives rise to a remedy are essentially the same question.
2.

The Vested Rights Theory

A second land use doctrine that operates in a similar fashion as
the nonconforming use theory is the "vested rights theory."' 66 Suppose, for example, that an individual purchases a lot with the
intention of constructing an apartment building. Before the zoning
is changed to allow only single-family residences, the individual:
(1) obtains a building permit, (2) relies in good faith on the permit;
(3) spends substantial amounts of money for materials and hiring
of workers; and (4) finishes all the construction except for the final
coat of paint. Under the vested rights theory, the individual would
be allowed to finish the apartment building. That does not mean,
however, that the changed zoning would be nullified with respect
to the lot. Upon completion, the apartment building would be a
nonconforming use, inconsistent with the single-family residence zon67
ing and therefore subject to a reasonable period of amortization.
This example demonstrates the connection between the nonconforming use theory and the vested rights theory. Under the nonconforming use theory, the "expectation" involved is the hope of
continuing an existing use; under the vested rights theory, the "expectation" involved is the hope of completing development to the
point where it will be protected as a nonconforming use. Thus, the
nonconforming use theory defines "property" as when expectations
of continuing existing uses will be protected; the vested rights theory
defines "property" as when expectations of completing incipient uses
will be protected.

166. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
167. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1083 (1977).
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3.

The Estoppel Theory
To illustrate the third land use doctrine, suppose that an individual
purchases a lot, but: (1) obtains only an informal approval to build
an apartment building from the local building inspector; (2) relies
in good faith upon the inspector's word; (3) hires an architect who
draws the requisite plans; and (4) buys the necessary timber and
has the lot graded and the cement foundation laid. The zoning is
then changed to prohibit apartment buildings. Because the individual
did not obtain a formal permit and because his reliance may not
have been "substantial," he probably has not met the rather rigorous
requirements under a strict vested rights theory.' 8 Under the "doctrine of equitable estoppel," however, the lot owner may nevertheless
69
be allowed to finish the apartment building if "justice" so requires.'
According to the equitable estoppel theory, the government will
be estopped from applying new laws where: (1) the government
official involved was aware that the plaintiff would rely on his
representations; (2) the official involved intended that his representation would be acted upon, or so acted as to reasonably give rise
to that inference; (3) the plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of
the law; (4) the plaintiff relied on the representation to his detriment;
and (5) estopping the government would not nullify a strong public
policy. 10 The estoppel doctrine is thus a close cousin to the vested
rights doctrine. The vested rights doctrine is more formal, with
relatively strict requirements; the estoppel doctrine is a "do justice"
construct, essentially requiring the plaintiff to throw himself at the
mercy of the court. "' Like the nonconforming use and vested rights
doctrines, however; the estoppel theory provides for determination
of the circumstances under which expectations will be accorded legal
72
protection and thus defines property.
C. The Need for a Coherent Federal Constitutional Property
Theory
The nonconforming use, vested rights and estoppel theories aptly
illustrate the artificiality of the distinction between the definition of
168. See infra note 173 (discussing strict and non-strict vested rights theories).

169. See, e.g., Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 57273 (Fla. 1975).
170. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 488-89, 476 P.2d
423, 442-44, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 42-44 (1970).

171. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 340 (describing interaction

between formation of property expectations and evolution of legal principles of
succession).
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property and governmental action affecting it. At the same time,
however, they demonstrate the need for a developed theory of federal
constitutional property. First, the protection afforded under each of
the theories varies from state to state.'73 Second, the only relief
available under each is temporary immunity from changed laws, not
damages. 7 4 A property owner dissatisfied with that level of protection
can reasonably be expected to look to the federal constitution for
possible additional relief. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court
has reserved a definite role for itself in defining "property."' 75 Yet,
just as there is no cogent standard for determining when governmental
action affecting property will require a remedy, 76 there is no established federal constitutional definition of property.'17 The closest
the Court has come to articulating a constitutional property standard
78
is Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington.

173. Most states adhere to the nonconforming use theory. See State v. Joyner,
286 N.C. 366, 375, 211 S.E.2d 320, 325 (discussing nonconforming use rule as
applied across country and adopting majority rule), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S.
1002 (1975). The Missouri courts prohibit altogether the immediate elimination of
nonconforming uses, however, on the ground that, the Supreme Court's holding
in Hadacheck notwithstanding, "no one has, as yet, been so brash as to contend
that such a pre-existing lawful nonconforming use properly might be terminated
immediately." People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F. Supp. 1345,
1357 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (applying Missouri law) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original); see also Missouri Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981).
The states vary far more regarding the requirements for triggering "vested rights"
protection. The requirements from California, see supra text accompanying note
167, are probably the most extensive. At the other extreme, in Washington, a
property owner generally acquires a vested right simply by having made an application for a permit before the zoning was changed. See West Main Associates
v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (1986). For a comparison of
"late vesting" rules such as California's and "early vesting" rules such as Washington's, see Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 157.
Similarly, states vary in their interpretation of the estoppel doctrine. See, e.g.,
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1970); Killearn Properties, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 366 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1979); Southern Nevada Memorial
Hosp. v. State, 101 Nev. 387, 705 P.2d 139 (1985); Pokoik v. Silsdorf, 40 N.Y.2d
769, 358 N.E.2d 874, 390 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976); Burdick v. Independent School Dist.
No. 52, 702 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1985); Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d
1032 (Utah 1984); In re McDonald's Corp., 146 Vt. 380, 505 A.2d 1202 (1985).
174. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text (discussing nonconforming
use theory).
175. See supra notes 19-151 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 41-123 and accompanying text.
177. On the contrary, the conventional wisdom espouses the proposition that
property is defined by state and extra-constitutional federal law. See supra notes
28-40 and accompanying text.
178. 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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In Hughes, the plaintiff was the successor in title to a federal grantee
of ocean-front lands. 17 9 Over the years, accretion had added to the
original boundaries. 80 The state supreme court held that under state
law, the accretions were state lands.' 8' The Supreme Court, however,
held that federal common law controlled the definition of property
rights to federal patent lands, and that under federal law, the upland
owner also owned the accretions.' 82 Justice Stewart found that the
state court decision in the case effectively overruled a twenty-year
holding that accretions belonged to upland owners. 183 He concluded
84
that the overruling of a twerity-year precedent was "startling."'1
Accordingly, he would have held that federally protected property
was involved and that it had been taken without just compensation.' 85
Under Justice Stewart's theory, a person has a right not to be
unduly "surprised" by a change in law prohibiting what was formerly
allowed with respect to property. 18 6 Expectations founded upon existing law can be interrupted-in fact, totally frustrated-as long as
the interruption or frustration could have been anticipated. 87 This
is similar to the Court's discussion of Monsanto's expectations in
Ruckelshaus: Monsanto should have been aware of the EPA's practice of disclosing testing and research information to applicants other
than those who submitted them and also should have been aware
of a change in FIFRA expressly allowing the EPA to disclose such
information after the expiration of a ten-year period from its sub-

179. See id. at 291.
180. See id.
181. See Hughes v. Washington, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P.2d 20, 29 (1966),
rev'd, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
182. 389 U.S. at 292-94.
183. See id. at 297-98 (Stewart, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 297 (Stewart, J., concurring).
185. Justice Stewart pointed out that the state court's proclamation that the
accretions were public lands was unquestionably a "taking" of property. Id. at
297-98 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Unlike the usual situation involving governmental action by the legislative or
executive branch, Justice Stewart conceived the judicial action in Hughes as constituting a taking. A recent illustrative case is Robinson v. Ariyoshi, in which the
court was asked to review a federal district court decision preventing the enforcement
of a Hawaii state supreme court decision which in turn had overruled state common
law water rights. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw.
1977), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986). The case is discussed further in Martinez,
Taking Time Seriously: The FederalConstitutionalRight to be Free From "Startling"
State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 297 (1988).
186. See Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring).
187. See id. at 296-98 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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mittal.'8 8 Accordingly, Monsanto should not have been unduly surprised that the EPA might disclose such information. In contrast,
for the period 1972 through 1978, when FIFRA expressly provided
that such information would not be disclosed, Monsanto would have
been unduly surprised by the prospect of disclosure. 1 9
There is, however, substantial room for interpretation regarding
whether circumstances involve a "startling" change or not. In Hadacheck; should the plaintiff have been surprised that the City of
Los Angeles prohibited use of his brickyard? 190 Surely the mere
prospect of land use regulation does not prepare one to have a use
treated as lawful one day and unlawful the next. Even if Hadacheck
should have been forewarned because of the industrial nature of his
use, what about Miller and his pigeons? 9' If public policy changes,
is the individual charged with predicting its direction? On the other
hand, in Loretto, should the plaintiff have been surprised that New
York City required that she allow the cable company to install cables
on her building? 92 The Court held in her favor. Yet, has tenants'
access to cable television now become a necessity similar to telephone,
electricity and sewer access, to the point that a landlord should
anticipate being required to allow its provision to his tenants?
. Justice Stewart's standard seems too uncertain to be workable.
More fundamentally, perhaps it boils down to the proposition that
property is simply that which cannot be taken, at all or without
compensation. If so, then a workable theory for resolving particular
cases becomes imperative. Yet, no such theory has been developed. 93

188. 467 U.S. at 993-97, 1006-10, 1013; see also supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
190. 239 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1915); see also supra notes 57-64 and accompanying
text.
191. See People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952); see also supra
notes 161-65.
192. 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982); see also supra notes 109-11 and accompanying

1
text.
193. For discussions regarding the definition of property for constitutional purposes, see Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law
and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1978) (United States Supreme Court
must establish minimum federal property) [hereinafter Glennon]; Michelman, Property As a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1981) ("the
Constitution does and must protect, as property, some claims that are not treated
as entitlements by standing law").
For a discussion of the minimum federal constitutional property rights from the
perspective of federalism concerns, see Glennon, supra; Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
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Reconstructing the Takings Problem by Redefining Property

This Article proposes that defining constitutional property and
determining when governmental action so affects it as to require a
remedy are not two distinct questions, but rather one: under what
circumstances is government justified in expanding, contracting or
94
even completely eliminating private expectations?
One way to attempt to define those circumstances is through
presupposing that property and governmental action affecting it are
two distinct inquiries, as both the just compensation and due process
theories under current takings doctrine seem to assume. '9- Under the
just compensation approach, the strong natural rights notion-that
property has an existence independent of governmental action-is
the basis for this separation.'96 Under natural rights theory, individual
rights pre-exist government; it is thus an objective of government
to recognize these rights.197 Accordingly, the just compensation theory
views rights as in some sense independent of government.'
The
natural rights approach in the just compensation theory, though,
may be partly responsible for the unworkable character of takings
doctrine generally. For example, nothing in the nature of property
tells society whether the extent of the financial impact on the particular person affected by the governmental action involved is important, or whether it is significant that government's obligation to
provide compensation may substantially deplete the public treasury
and, consequently, preclude other government programs that might
have been undertaken, thereby jeopardizing government's ability to
protect the community.

194. More specifically, this issue concerns the circumstances under which private
expectations can be affected by governmental action regardless of whether compensation is provided. For similar observations about the interconnections among
the various components of the takings doctrine problem, see Alexander, The Concept
of Property in Private and ConstitutionalLaw: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn
in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1598 (1982); Rose, supra note 99, at
598-99; Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 372, 424-25 (1986).
195. See supra notes 41-127 and accompanying text.
196. This may be the impetus for a narrow definition of the relevant property
in just compensation clause jurisprudence. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying
text (discussing narrow definition of relevant property in Pennsylvania Coal); see
also Rose, supra note 99, at 568 (describing broad definition of relevant property
as "deep pocket" rule).
197. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405,
408-09 (1979).
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The due process approach, the other strong current in existing
takings doctrine, also presupposes that property and governmental
action affecting it are two distinct inquiries; in contrast to the just
compensation theory, however, due process emphasizes the preservation of collective well-being. 199 Nothing in the nature of government
tells society, however, how collective well-being is limited by the
expectations of the individuals affected. Yet, surely there is a legitimate claim that in certain circumstances, social well-being should
not be achieved at the sacrifice of the individual. The .due process
tradition, however, does not address the proper scope of individual
concerns.
Perhaps the first step toward reconstructing the takings problem
is to rethink society's views about property. It will then be possible
to identify the factors involved in reviewing governmental action
with respect to private expectations and thereafter begin the formulation of an analytical model for resolving particular cases.
A.

Property as Sovereignty

The essential similarity between property and governmental action
is noted by Professor Morris Cohen in an article entitled "Property
and Sovereignty." 2°0 Professor Cohen explains that property evolved
from two distinct traditions, one a "dualist conception" and the
other a "unitary conception." 2 0 The dualist conception makes a
sharp distinction between the private and public spheres of law:
20 2
property lies in the private sphere, sovereignty in the public sphere.
The unitary conception, however, combines property and sovereignty.

199. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
200. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) [hereinafter
Cohen]. In a brief but provocative reference, Professor Cohen intimates that his
ideas have implications for takings theory:
An adequate theory of private property, however, should enable us to
draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable cases of confiscation.
Such a theory I cannot undertake to elaborate on this occasion, though

the doctrine of security of possession and avoidance of unnecessary shock
seem to me suggestive.
Id. at 26.
Professor Michelman describes his own seminal article on the takings problem

as an elaboration of Professor Cohen's statements. See Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1202 n.78 (1967).
201. See Cohen, supra note 200, at 8-9.
202. See id. at 8. The dualist conception may have sprung from Roman law,
under which "dominium" was the rule over things by the individual and "imperium"
was the rule over individuals by the prince. See id. at 8-9.
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According to that conception, society should view ownership of
property as society views governmental power. °3

Professor Cohen rejects the dualist conception because it purports
to define property rights solely as power over things.20 4 He contends
that property rights embody power over other people.0 5 The most

significant aspect of that power, he argues, is "the right to exclude."

2°6

Professor Cohen claims that the right to exclude has two

ramifications. First, it confers on the property holder the power to
make others do what he wants in order to be allowed use of
property involved.2 °7 Second, it confers on the property holder
power to force others to contribute more property to him in
form of rents or user fees.2 °8 Professor Cohen concludes that

the
the
the
the

203. Through the 18th Century, Hessian princes sold their subjects as soldiers
to rulers of other states. See id. at 9. Early feudal relations were unitary in that
they combined sovereignty and property in the landlord:
The essence of feudal law . . . [was] the inseparable connection between
land tenure and personal homage involving ... services on the part of
the tenant and ... sovereignty by the landlord .... Ownership of the

land and local political sovereignty were inseparable.
Id.
Early feudal constraints on alienation restricted the ownership of land and thus
reserved the "sovereign" power that land conferred to a privileged few. See id.
at 9-10. As the law evolved away from such feudal constraints on alienation of
land, and land became more marketable, however, the sovereign power of land
became available to more people, at least in theory. See id. at 10. Except through
gifts, inheritances or adverse possession, however, people could not acquire land
without money. Thus, a free market in land simply transformed a land economy
into a money economy. Money became the basis for sovereign power. Money could
be used to acquire any kind of property, though, not just land. Accordingly,
sovereign power, formerly restricted to ownership of land, became common to all
forms of property. See id.
204. See id. at 12.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 12-13. Some commentators assert that property has essential characteristics other than the right to exclude. See, e.g., L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18-19 (1977) (listing eleven other property elements).
The concept of property has evolved dramatically throughout the last two centuries.
See, e.g., Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691 (1938) [hereinafter Philbrick]; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964); Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development
of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980) [hereinafter
Vandevelde]. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld articulated the most comprehensive and
influential reconceptualization. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As
Applied in JudicialReasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
207. Cohen, supra note 200, at 12.

208. See id. Professor Cohen explains the tenet in this way:
If then somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or
the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the
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former is fundamentally indistinguishable from governmental power
to control people through civil or criminal laws and that the latter
2 1
is similarly indistinguishable from governmental power to tax. 1
Property ownership thus comprises the power to command the
services of people who are not economically independent and the
power to tax the future social product-both of which also constitute
the essence of sovereignty.2 0 Professor Cohen's conclusion, therefore,
suggests that dominium over things necessarily implies imperium over
people.
B.

Limiting Property-Qua-Sovereignty

Professor Cohen's insight is that property is indistinguishable from
governmental power. He argues, therefore, that "it is necessary to
apply to .

.

..property all those considerations of social ethics and

enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the discussion
of any just form of government." 2 1
Professor Cohen seems to suggest that property is like governmental power and since society limits governmental power, society
should limit property-qua-sovereignty as well. 21 2 Perhaps society already does. The paradigmatic case is eminent domain. There is no
question that property can be taken for public use as long as
compensation is paid and certain procedures are followed. 2 3 Thus,
the exercise of eminent domain limits private expectations. The
exercise of the police power through zoning is a similar constraint.
The due process theory reveals that substantial reductions in expectations can be imposed through zoning. 21 4 Even under the just
compensation theory, private expectations can apparently be severely
restricted through zoning before a public obligation to provide compensation arises.2 5 Judicial action, through the formulation and

extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the
law thus confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what
I want.
Id.
209. See id. at 13. For a similar observation, see Vandevelde, supra note 206,
at 327-28.
210. Cohen, supra note 200, at 13; see also Philbrick, supra note 206, at 69697 (referring to two major characteristics of property as property for use and
property for power).
211. Cohen, supra note 200, at 14.
212. See id.
213. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 43-73 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 74-127 and accompanying text.
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application of common-law doctrines, also limits private expectations.
The judicially-evolved nonconforming use, vested rights and estoppel
cases similarly reveal that private expectations may be severely curtailed, although it depends on the degree and kind of private reliance
2
involved. 6
The quandary presented by the takings problem is not whether
private expectations may be limited, but rather, under what circumstances. This Article demonstrates that property and governmental
action affecting it are, in essence, the same question. Property is
not only similar to governmental power, as Professor Cohen suggests,
but is a function of it. It is therefore perfectly reasonable to restrict
property as society restricts governmental power, because that is
ultimately what property is.2 7 It remains to specify what factors
should be considered in restricting property-qua-sovereignty and to

develop an analytical approach for particular applications.
Recent analyses of the notion of rights of property may help
identify these factors. Professor Margaret Radin, for example, urges

that property is most satisfactorily understood not as an object apart
from those who own it, but as intrinsic to the personality of those
who use it. 2' 8 She argues that the most significant function of

property is the support of "personhood":'

9

216. See supra notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
217. The debate about subjecting private conduct to the same restraints as
governmental action has revolved around the state action doctrine. See Stone,
Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1483-92 (1982) (arguing for elimination of requirement
altogether) [hereinafter Stone]. For a demonstration of the decline in the publicversus-private conduct distinction for purposes of determining whether state action
is involved, see Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). The accepted wisdom is that purely private action
remains free from constitutional constraint:
Where an ordinary mortal is concerned, we can discern a value in
preserving a sphere, free from state influence, in which he or she may
be arbitrary, capricious, and prejudicial.
Stone, supra, at 1489.
Professor Brest, however, demonstrates the fundamental connection between the
state action doctrine and the natural rights theory of property: state action doctrine
prevents examination of assertions of private power in the name of rights to
property existing independently of government. See Brest, State Action and Liberal
Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 12991300 (1982). This Article has shown that the natural rights notion is reflected in
the takings doctrine and similarly prevents examination of private power.
218. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
219. Id. at 959-61; see also Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?,
34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 825-28 (1985) (property interests that implicate "personhood" concerns such as free speech or privacy should be given greater judicial
protection).
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[The notion that people] invest part of their identity in material
objects, such as diaries, wedding bands, family homes, and religious or cultural shrines [an identification which] characteristically
occurs through the objects' particular relation to people's histories
or traditions. .

.

. The personhood function of property is to

protect people's control of the unique objects and the specific
spaces that are intertwined with their present
and developing
20
individual personality or group identity. 1
On the other hand, Professor C. Edwin Baker explores the treatment
of property from a broader perspective. 22 ' He examines whether
government regulation of property should differ from government
regulation of activities such as speech, procreation and association
that currently receive greater constitutional protection.2 2 Professor
Baker suggests that the question is not whether society should treat
property interests as society treats liberty interests, but rather whether
society should refine its treatment of property interests. 2 3 He argues
that under the prevalent, monolithic notion of property, society
commonly subsumes many different interests which should be treated
differently for constitutional purposes. 2 4 Thus, Professor Baker concludes that "the constitutional status of a governmental rule or
practice that abolishes, creates, changes, or regulates some specific
property right . . . should depend on the functions or values" which

25
that interest serves for the individual.
For Professor Baker, the personhood function described by Professor Radin is only a specific instance of a general "use" function
of property. Professor Baker describes the general use-function as
follows: "People rely on, consume, or transform resources in many
of their self-expressive, developmental, productive, and survival activities. These uses of resources are integral to a person's liberty,
viewed either as self-realization or as self-determination. "226
A second specific instance of the general use-function according
to Professor Baker is the "welfare function," intended to secure
an individual's claim to those resources that are essential for a
"meaningful life.'' 227 Particularly important are those necessities es-

220. Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1986).
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sential for "survival" and for "meaningful existence as understood
in a person's own community. ' 22 8 Professor Baker contrasts the
welfare and personhood function in the way each contributes to a
person's well-being. According to him, the welfare function requires
"protection of claims to generic types of resources," whereas the
personhood function requires "protection of specific, unique objects
or spaces.

229

In addition to the use-related functions, Professor Baker describes
the protection, allocative and sovereignty functions of property. The
"protection function" protects individuals from "unjust exploitation
by other individuals or by governments. 2 ' 30 Thus, it would be unacceptable "for either the state or a private entity invidiously or
otherwise unfairly to pick out a particular person or group to bear
some unwanted burden." 23' The "allocative function" facilitates certain means by which individuals "secure the resources that they need
for their productive or consumptive activities. 2 13 2 This is not so
much a function for protection of individual interests as it is a
function for the realization of collective concern about the allocation
of resources toward whatever ends are collectively deemed desirable.
Thus, "[i]f there is an individual . . . right here, it could only be
the right to decide autonomously how to participate politically in
the necessarily collective decision." '33 Closely connected to the allocative function is the "sovereignty function," described by Professor Baker as the power to influence others through controlling
23 4
the terms under which property will be exchanged.
An example may help illustrate these various functions. Suppose
that an individual is a large-scale land developer and a small part
of one of his various tracts of land is downzoned from apartment
to single-family residence use. Assume further that the person had
hoped to build apartments. General use-function may be involved,
in the self-determination sense, because the individual can no longer
choose to build apartments. The sovereignty function may also be
involved, since the land may not command as high a market price
zoned for single-family residences as it would when zoned for apartments and the individual cannot influence others to pay him the
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higher market price. In contrast, the use-welfare function is probably
not involved, since the individual probably has the necessities of life
irrespective of the rezoning. Similarly, it is doubtful that the usepersonhood function is involved, since the person probably did not
"define himself" in terms of being able to build apartments. Moreover, the protection function seems not to be involved, since as a
large-scale developer, the individual can probably still control sufficient resources to prevent exploitation by others. If the individual
is not a very successful developer, however, and is down to his last
penny, perhaps then the protection function might be involved.
Finally, the allocative function may be involved if the individual
has no opportunity to participate politically in the collective decision
to rezone. This might occur if the person was not provided with
adequate notice of the local government's consideration of the ordinance rezoning the property and was thereby deprived of the
opportunity to be heard regarding its merits.
C. Prerequisites to Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine Along
Functional Lines
A number of questions have to be addressed before a functional
orientation with respect to property can serve as the foundation for
reconstructing the takings doctrine. For example, which property
functions should be given legal recognition?235 Are there functions
served by property that are not included in Professor Baker's list
or that should not be there? Moreover, should the functions that
are legally recognized be arranged into a hierarchy, with some given
greater weight than others? To take the example set out above,
suppose that the individual is a land developer and a small portion
of one of his land tracts is downzoned from apartment to singlefamily residential use. Functions usually identified with economic
concerns are involved-the general use function of being able to
choose to build apartments, and the sovereignty function of being
able to command the higher apartment-use market price. On the
other hand, the use-personhood function, usually identified with an
emotional attachment, is arguably not involved. Contrast this situation with that of a gray-haired, eighty-five year-old widow in poor
health who owns an old house that stands in the path of a proposed
freeway. Suppose further that the house was built by her husband

235. Professor Baker acknowledges that his decision to specify the functions he
selected involves value choices and particular perspectives. See id. at 753 n.25.
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and that all her children were born and raised in it. She has a
strong emotional tie to the house, over and above its economic value
to her or to anyone else. In functional terms, her use-personhood
interest is involved, but little else. Does that function nevertheless
have overriding importance? Would it override even a governmental
claim of eminent domain?
V.

Conclusion

The social implications of a functional approach should govern
not only the definition and hierarchical arrangement of property
functions, but also the allocation of institutional responsibility between courts and legislatures in determining which functions are
given legal recognition and in establishing the hierarchical order of
those functions. The social implications should include whether everyone would be entitled to a minimum amount of resources, and if
so, what effect that would have on the ways in which society provides
for the poor.23 6 Moreover, how such factors would affect private
enterprise incentives, particularly whether individuals should be prohibited from acquiring more than a maximum amount of resources,
would also have to be considered. In light of these and other similarly
profound social implications, perhaps identification and hierarchical
ordering of the functions of property should be an exclusively legislative matter. Legislation could address the problems raised by
current approaches to takings situations, identify the functions that
should be given legal recognition and arrange them in a hierarchical
order. By identifying the relevant questions, this Article may serve
as a first step toward reconstruction of existing takings doctrine
along functional lines.

236. Professor Baker contends that to deny a person tfe resources the community
considers necessary to satisfy the use-welfare function "should be unacceptable
under our constitutional order." Id. at 746.

